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Preface
THE present article, originally titled “Seishin to Reisei—Bukkyo Kindaika noNitenkei AS (Spirit and Spirituality: Two
Models of the Modernization of Japanese Buddhism),” was written by 
Hashimoto Mineo as an Introduction to Kiyozawa Manshi/Suzuki
Daisetz for the 43rd volume of Nihon no meicho B*®^
< (The Greatest Books in Japan), published by Chuokoron-sha TTWIwtt in 
1984. The reason we have translated and republished this article in our spe­
cial issue on Kiyozawa Manshi is that it aptly illustrates the personality and 
thought of Kiyozawa Manshi, a man little known among foreign scholars in 
contrast to the highly renowned Suzuki Daisetz.
Hashimoto Mineo (1924-1984) studied Western philosophy at Kyoto Uni­
versity, taught the same at Kobe University and also became the head priest 
of Honen-in a famous Buddhist temple in Kyoto. Hashimoto’s path
from a philosopher to a Buddhist was the same as Kiyozawa’s and the shift 
from a layman to a priest was also common to both. Hashimoto was very 
proud of their common background and admired Kiyozawa Manshi as his 
forerunner.
Since Hashimoto’s original Introduction is long, we have omitted some 
parts of it for this publication. Moreover, so that it can be read more easily, 
we have added chapters and sections in order to reorganize the original text.
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The three sections, “Suzuki no shogai $#©41 (Life of Suzuki),” “Suzuki 
Daisetz ron fitAAliEim (Discourse on Suzuki Daisetz)” and “Sokuhi no ronri 
(Logic of Sokuhi),” are omitted from Chapter 3: “Reisei no hito- 
Suzuki Daisetz #140 A • (Man of Spirituality—Suzuki Daisetz).”
Furthermore, in order to make it more readable as an independent article, some 
expressions have been changed and some historical facts, which may be hard 
for foreign readers to follow, have also been omitted. Lastly, The Collected 
Works of Kiyozawa Manshi (8 volumes) referred to in the
Introduction, have been published by Hozokan iiit.
— Editors
I. Introduction
1. Two Unsurpassable Giants
Kiyozawa Manshi and Suzuki Daisetz are two lofty peaks, rising high in the 
century-old history of the modernization of Japanese Buddhism. While this 
is a term with a variety of meanings, here it means to reform, strengthen and 
promote traditional or conventional Buddhism, by responding to and resist­
ing the introduction of Western thought and civilization after the Meiji peri­
od. For that purpose, Buddhism first had to be equipped with logic and turned 
into an academic discipline, i.e., reconstructed into a coherent philosophical 
system. To put it simply, Buddhism had to be accepted by modem intellec­
tuals first in order to have the possibility of shaking the foundation of their 
modernist consciousness. Although all religions consist of ideas (doctrines), 
actions (rituals), and community (religious organization), the modernization 
of Buddhism had to be started in the area of doctrine; in other words, the ini­
tial modernization of Buddhism was the active reconsideration of traditional 
Buddhist teachings. In this respect, Kiyozawa and Suzuki are the representa­
tives and reformers of Pure Land (Shinshu MS) and Zen Buddhism, respec­
tively. Moreover, they both went well beyond the boundaries of the Buddhist 
schools mentioned above.
During the history of modem Buddhism in Japan, there have been a num­
ber of great scholars, ascetics, preachers and activists. Among these, 
Kiyozawa and Suzuki are, at least for me, unsurpassable, in the sense that they 
were attractive enough for others to want to imitate yet, at the same time, pow­
erful enough to make these people think that such imitation was impossible.
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2. Notability of Kiyozawa and Suzuki
How well known is Kiyozawa Manshi today? When you see his name and 
Suzuki Daisetz’s listed as representatives of modern Japanese Buddhism, 
many of you may be puzzled. The name and achievements of Suzuki Daisetz, 
as an exponent of modem Zen, are quite well recognized throughout the 
world. Kiyozawa Manshi’s name and achievements, on the other hand, are 
only known among a limited number of intellectuals and within specific reli­
gious orders, and are probably half-obscured from public awareness. Even in 
Nagoya, where he was bom, and in Kyoto and Tokyo, where he made his 
career, his name has almost disappeared from people’s memories. The prin­
cipal of Tsutsui Elementary School where the monument com­
memorating Kiyozawa’s birthplace stands, hardly knew of his achievements. 
More amazingly, his grandchild, who is now the head priest of Kiyozawa’s 
home temple, Saiho-ji in Ohama (Aichi prefecture), turned to me
and asked with all honesty: “Was my grandfather such a great person?” While 
this was a rather refreshing experience for me, and Kiyozawa would have 
been happy to hear it, it shows that since even his nearest relatives feel this 
way, no wonder the public do not know his name. When the plan for WzTzom 
no Meicho was first announced, I was told that the most common questions 
and complaints from readers to the publishing company (Chuokoron-sha) 
were about why Kiyozawa’s name was included among some fifty or more 
great figures representing Japan. They kept on asking who this Kiyozawa 
Manshi was.
This reaction seems only natural. In terms of notability, there is a world of 
difference between Suzuki Daisetz and Kiyozawa Manshi. Suzuki, who has 
closed his life of ninety-plus years recently and whose name was first known 
abroad, left 30 volumes of writings and received the Order of Culture 
*). Kiyozawa, on the other hand, ended his short life of forty-one years in 
the Meiji period, published only a few books, and was active only within a 
specific religious organization. His thoughts and actions, however, are easi­
ly on par with those of Suzuki. In my mind, the main goal of this volume is 
to introduce Kiyozawa to the world again and, for that purpose, asking the 
world-renowned Suzuki to play a supporting role. Therefore, I am intent on 
proceeding with this Introduction in such a light.
3. Suzuki Daisetz’s View on Kiyozawa Manshi
Kiyozawa was bom in 1863 and was seven years older than Suzuki, who was 
bom in 1870. In the mid-Meiji period, when the former was making his career, 
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Suzuki was in the United States. Thus, there was no direct contact between 
the two. In 1963, he expressed his own views on Kiyozawa when writing for 
the one-hundred-year commemoration of his birth. Though it is rather long, 
I would like to quote this passage as our introduction to Kiyozawa:
Although I’ve never met Kiyozawa in person, the first time I 
heard his name was at the time of the World’s Parliament of 
Religions held in Chicago in 1893. I was partially involved in this 
convention and .at that time, I came across his book, Skeleton of a 
Philosophy of Religion. The exact content of that book I do not 
recall, but he seemed to have quite unprecedented ideas for that 
time. The Meiji period was the time when remarkable progress was 
made in every area of Japanese cultural history. Effervescent, up- 
and-coming young people were everywhere, and among those, 
Kiyozawa was prominent not only due to his intellect, but also 
because his strong will and passion were penetrated by the depth of 
his faith. Today, such prominence is still maintained among his 
pupils. You may say that Kiyozawa was indeed a type of genius in 
this realm.
Kiyozawa’s emphasis on Absolute Other Power (zettai tariki 
was certainly passed down from the founder of Shin 
Buddhism, Shinran Ji®. At the basis of this emphasis, we can also 
detect Kiyozawa’s own living faith. For mere words about Other 
Power usually have no power in themselves. Any adherent of Shin 
Buddhism can speak such words, but their truth can only be 
achieved in someone like the mydkonin such as Asahara
Saiichi SIMT’Tfi. Kiyozawa added intellectual acuity to this faith 
and there is something in his thought that is readily accepted by 
today’s younger generation. The influence of his vibrant, living 
faith must have resonated through the hearts of those who had close 
contact with him in his time.
Though living to be 100 may be difficult for anyone, I believe he 
would have lived to my age (94 years old), if modem advanced 
medicine had been available at that time. If that were the case, I 
believe his thought would have been even more brilliant than what 
it had been in the short span of thirty or forty years. However, since 
all this ultimately depends on the working of the Tathagata, there 
is little more I can say.
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The idea of jinen hdni § (natural becoming through the
working of the Dharma) is deeply embedded throughout Buddhism. 
This teaching is where we can find the deepest meanings of Eastern 
thought, as well as where we can most easily fall into shallow iner­
tia. I insist that within “jinen honi,” we must acknowledge a sense 
of constant endeavor. Things need to be renewed each day. Now 
progress is expected of Buddhism in all areas. We await a second 
Kiyozawa or the second coming of Kiyozawa.1
1 “Foreword” in Fukuda 1963.
4. The Nature of Buddhism in the Thought of Kiyozawa and Suzuki 
Kiyozawa and Suzuki each represented a different, but equally complete, 
model for the reconceptualization of Buddhism in the modem age. In his 
experiment to modernize Buddhism, Kiyozawa approached Buddhism (reli­
gion) through the medium of the dialectic logic of Western philosophy. In 
other words, he moved from philosophy to religion. Suzuki, on the other hand, 
tried to modernize Buddhism by moving from religion to philosophy. 
Through his Zen experience, he uncovered the logic of non-duality (sokuhi 
no ronri fiPJPOfmS). While Kiyozawa attempted to realize Buddhism through 
the exclusive choice of the Pure Land tradition, Suzuki aimed at a universal 
Buddhism by demonstrating the ultimate oneness of Zen and Pure Land teach­
ings. It can be said that, in their respective approaches, Kiyozawa provided 
the model for an ethical take on Buddhism, while Suzuki represented an aes­
thetic one.
Although this is a rather bold outline of their vast work, to summarize it 
even more roughly, the central concept in Kiyozawa’s modernization of 
Buddhist thought was “seishin (Spirit),” while that of Suzuki’s was “rei-
sei S£'I4 (Spirituality).” The former is a concept mediated by Western philos­
ophy, presupposing dualism in the reality and logic of religious experience. 
The latter is a genuine Japanese or Eastern concept based on monism.
If religion is considered to be the relationship between a “subject” and the 
“Absolute” (sacred), for Kiyozawa, “seishin” means the attempt of the sub­
ject to realize its mutual relationship with the Absolute, while for Suzuki, “rei­
ser means the work of the Absolute to subsume the subject. In other words, 
Kiyozawa tries to leap from “seishin” (i.e., the West) to “reisei” (i.e., the 
East) and Suzuki tries to encompass “seishin” (i.e., the West) inside of “rei­
sei” (i.e., the East). Since religion is a self-realized fact concerning “the 
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Absolute,” it is meaningless to ask who, Kiyozawa or Suzuki, is right. 
However, I must confess that I personally respect Kiyozawa more than 
Suzuki. While Kiyozawa remains unsurpassable for me, Suzuki feels like a 
famous, distant relative.
Further, Kiyozawa was also a reformer of Buddhism as an institution. I 
mentioned earlier that the modernization of Buddhism needed to cover all 
three aspects of doctrine, ritual, and organization. As a minister of a Shin 
Buddhist denomination, Kiyozawa promoted reform not only in the area of 
doctrine, but also in the other two areas. Although Buddhism has been pro­
fessed by many of the greatest intellectuals of each historical period and has 
occasionally been through restoration and transformation, in reality, the cus­
tom of so-called Funeral Buddhism (sdshiki bukkyd has sustained
institutional Buddhism throughout Japanese history. It can also be said that 
the biggest problem of Buddhism today may still lie in this gap between intel­
lectual and popular Buddhism. Someone has to reform the religious organi­
zation so that the gap between the two threads of Buddhism can be bridged. 
Kiyozawa Manshi tried very hard to do this, though finally, he seemed to end 
in failure. Here again, I cannot help but feel that Kiyozawa is simply beyond 
compare.
5. My Relation to Kiyozawa and Suzuki
I think I should put down a few words about my own religious inclination. In 
terms of religious experience and ideas, I am following about the same path 
as Kiyozawa Manshi, in the sense that I too have moved from Western phi­
losophy to Pure Land Buddhism. I was bom into a lay family, and in my youth, 
having neither interest in nor need for religion, I pursued Western philoso­
phy. After passing the age of thirty, and led by various conditions, I became 
a Buddhist priest. Now, I am teaching Western philosophy at a university and 
have become the head minister of a small Pure Land temple. Below is a brief 
outline of my understanding of the Pure Land teaching.
Its core is in the “faith (shinjin 1BL')” of Amida Buddha’s “Original Vow 
(hongan ^®).” This Original Vow of the Tathagata for the salvation of all 
sentient beings is explained in the form of a myth in the Larger 
Sukhavativyuha Sutra (Daimuryojukyd A.Vffl Wd. For me, a major problem 
lay in the way this myth is set out. When Amida Buddha was still the 
Bodhisattva Dharmakara (Hozo Bosatsu ffijSHrW, he made 48 Vows, all of 
which are expressed in the Chinese Buddhist scripture as “If, when I attain 
Buddhahood, [this condition is not fulfilled], may I not attain perfect
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Enlightenment ■ • • T'ExlEK).” In the Japanese translation of the
Sanskrit scripture, it reads: “If, after I have attained Enlightenment, [as long 
as this condition exists], may I not attain true supreme Enlightenment.” 
Dharmakara had accomplished these Vows and became Amida Buddha. His 
Pure Land of Ultimate Bliss has surely been completed. However, is the Pure 
Land entirely the Other Shore (higan ®^)? Could it be that the light of the 
Tathagata of Immeasurable Light, unhindered throughout the ten directions, 
will never reach this defiled world (shaba §cg)? If not, then how could peo­
ple in this defiled world attain “faith” through the working of Absolute Other 
Power? Amida is the Buddha of Immeasurable Light. And yet, Dharmakara 
could not have attained perfect Enlightenment until this defiled world became 
a Pure Land. If he became the Buddha and remained transcendent in the Other 
World like the God of Christianity, then wouldn’t we in this defiled world be 
left in the lurch? Don’t Dharmakara’s Vows take this form (“If, when I attain 
Buddhahood, . . . , may I not attain perfect Enlightenment”) because these 
were made specfically with us, of this defiled world, in mind? (These are my 
own ideas, and not to be confused with the official doctrine of the Pure Land 
denominations.) It is troubling if Amida Buddha has not become a Buddha; 
if he has, however, that also becomes troublesome. This was my problem.
Then, I came across the following poem by a mydkdnin Tochihira Fuji ffi 
4LAU, a farmer’s wife from Oku-Noto With this, my “faith” became
steadfast:
Where does Hozo [Dharmakara] have his place of practice?
All of it is in the pith of my bosom, Namu Amida Butsu.
It was Suzuki’s Mydkdnin WFA (published in 1948) that told me about her 
for the first time. In this sense, Suzuki was my guide to Pure Land Buddhism. 
The first book I read of his was Shukyo keiken no jijitsu (Truth
of Religious Experience), also a study of the mydkdnin, published in 1943. I 
came across it by chance while I was in high school during World War II. My 
next book by Suzuki was Zen no shiso WOJS,® (Zen Thought), which I pur­
chased second-hand at around the same time. In the back of this book, the 
previous owner had scribbled: “I don’t understand what it means. I have no 
idea what it is about. I sort of understand, but don’t understand,” which also 
reflected my own feelings after reading this book. My understanding of Zen 
still remains the same today due to my lack of intelligence. However, now I 
do have the task of explaining Suzuki Daisetz and there is no other way for 
me to approach him but as my Pure Land teacher. I think Buddhism, in spite 
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of its diversity, must ultimately be one. Suzuki, who claims the oneness of 
Zen and Pure Land Buddhism, is an irreplaceable teacher for me.
It was much later that I found out about Kiyozawa Manshi. I first knew 
about him as a pioneer of importing Western philosophy to Japan. More 
importantly, however, he was the first to search for the “logic” of a religious 
peace of mind (anjin SU), which was deeply concerned with my own prob­
lem: How is it logically possible to say that Amida has already attained 
Buddhahood and, at the same time, has not?
By following the thoughts and actions of Kiyozawa and Suzuki, let us now 
explore the possibility of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism today.
II. Kiyozawa Manshi—Man of Seishin
1. His Birth
The significance of Kiyozawa Manshi as a modem Buddhist was aptly char­
acterized by Soga Ryojin (1875-1971), one of his spiritual succes­
sors, as follows: “Until Kiyozawa appeared, no one seriously considered 
Other Power faith. Without him, Shinran would never have been regarded as 
one of the pinnacles in Japanese intellectual history. The faith, which 
Kiyozawa devoted his entire life to achieving, will long remain in the annals 
of Japanese Buddhism and may be the greatest accomplishment since Honen 
and Shinran.”
Before Kiyozawa came into the picture, from the time of its formation 
Japanese Pure Land and Shinran’s schools had been ignored by most intel­
lectuals as a religion for the ignorant masses. What kind of path did he have 
to tread to achieve it? Let us now trace his journey from its beginning.
On June 26, 1863, Kiyozawa Manshi (Mannosuke was bom in
Nagoya as the eldest son of Tokunaga Naganori the chief of a foot
soldiers’ regiment of the Owari Tokugawa house. The fact that he was bom 
into a low-ranking samurai family on the Tokugawa side during the Meiji 
Restoration, meant that he had no hope of advancement in the 
Satsuma/Choshu-dominated government. Many intellectuals of that time, 
especially in the field of religion, such as Inoue Enryo #±flT and Murakami 
Sensho of Buddhism, Uchimura Kanzo of Christianity,
Uemura Masahisa WJIEA. and Niijima Jo were all in the same situa­
tion.
After the Meiji Restoration, the family was reduced to poverty and his 
father had to peddle tea from a bamboo basket. According to his own “Outline 
of my Academic Record (shugaku rireki gairyaku Kiyozawa 
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entered a newly-established foreign language school (English) in Nagoya at 
the age of 12 in 1875, but this was closed down in 1878. Then, he studied 
German at Aichi Prefectural Medical School but stopped soon after, proba­
bly due to financial difficulties. The record then states: “In 1879 (16 years 
old), moved to Kyoto in January, was ordained a Shin Buddhist priest in 
February, and entered Ikuei School in March.” Later, Kiyozawa confessed 
that, “I became a priest because Honganji told me if I did so they would sup­
port my studies, and not with the noble intentions that Honen or Shinran had 
had.” Such a sentiment seems understandable considering that the young 
Kiyozawa had already learned English and German, and was excellent in his 
schoolwork. Incidentally, Honen and Shinran were also ordained when 
young, but did not experience their true calling until much later when they 
became true Buddhists. At any rate, the main reason for Kiyozawa’s ordina­
tion was poverty.
2. His Studies
With respect to his ordination, Kiyozawa’s family background should also be 
noted. The Tokai region where they lived was a stronghold of the Higashi 
Honganji (Shinshu Otani-ha) organization. His parents, especially his moth­
er, were ardent followers. Together with them, he had been reading Shinran’s 
Shdshinge JEfiS®, Wasan full and Rennyo’s Ofumi WA every day from the 
age of five or six. This background qualified him for support under the denom­
ination’s educational policy, which stated that “exceptional students are to be 
recruited from among the children of our followers and to be educated using 
scholarship funds.” Higashi Honganji founded the Ikuei School in July 1876 
and the abbot stated that it was created “to build a firm foundation from which 
we can compete with Shinto, other Buddhist denominations, and foreign reli­
gions,” and also to better the situation where “some followers’ children 
seemed to go astray and even violate laws, because they neither receive prop­
er education nor understand the truth of Shin Buddhism.” In other words, the 
scholarship system was established to restore and maintain the religious insti­
tution, which was facing an external threat from the Meiji government’s anti­
Buddhist, pro-Shinto policies and Christian advancement as well as internal 
concern over the degeneration within the denomination.
After studying in Kyoto for four years, Kiyozawa was sent to Tokyo to 
further his learning. He entered the Preparatory School of Tokyo Imperial 
University in January 1883 and was enrolled in its Philosophy Department in 
September, 1884. Throughout his study at university, he was always first in 
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his class and received a scholarship. How he felt about his studies may be 
found in the following passage of his diary:
Almost 20 years have already passed since I was bom. If I convert 
this into the number of days, with 360 days a year, that would be 
7200 days. If I convert that into minutes, that would be 10,368,000 
minutes and, in seconds, 622,080,000. This is an enormous amount 
of time indeed, but what I have accomplished so far has been growth 
in the length of my body and (an ever so slight) change in my brain.2
2 KMZ, vol. 8, p. 3.
3 Shiba 1969.
As Shiba Ryotaro acutely pointed out, Kiyozawa was a cerebral
type who had to calculate 20 years in such a manner to feel the actual length 
of time. According to him, Kiyozawa “was not the type who can grasp the 
heart of the matter with artistic intuition, but who reaches a certain conclu­
sion after rigorous rational investigation.”3
Kiyozawa also made the following remark: “During the cherry blossom 
season, people carry their bottles of sake and picnic baskets and go under the 
floriferous cherry trees and pleasantly drink and eat. I don’t know why they 
do this. It does not make sense to me.” Kiyozawa was truly a man of the Meiji 
period; he was indeed already a man of “seishin,” especially in terms of his 
strong work ethic and stoicism.
3. Encountering Hegel through Fenollosa
Kiyozawa studied Western philosophy under Ernest Fenollosa, the first for­
eign professor in the Philosophy Department at Tokyo Imperial University, 
who gave lectures on German Idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel as well as British philosophers such as Mill and Spencer. Fenollosa 
taught that the harmony between Hegel and Spencer, the pinnacles of German 
and British philosophy, should be the goal for the development of philosophy 
in the future. However, for Kiyozawa’s “philosophy,” his encounter with 
Hegelian philosophy came to have a great significance.
Along with Miyake Setsurei his senior in the Philosophy Depart­
ment, Kiyozawa was the first to critically deal with Hegelian philosophy in 
Japan. Hegel’s organic system with universal “Reason” and the dialectic syl­
logism of the finite, the Infinite, and “Spirit” was later reinterpreted from a 
Buddhist perspective in Kiyozawa’s philosophy (Philosophy of Religion).
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Kiyozawa’s original intention in studying in Tokyo was to become a 
philosopher. While there, he joined the Philosophy Society, founded by Inoue 
Enryo, also a recipient of the Higashi Honganji scholarship, and became the 
editor of Tetsugakkai zasshi TfYJPWP (Journal of the Philosophy 
Association) along with Okada Ryohei After graduating in July
1888, Kiyozawa continued his studies in the philosophy of religion at the 
graduate level and became a board member of the newly-established 
Tetsugakukan WYfi'E (Academy of Philosophy), where he taught classes in 
psychology, logic, and philosophy. Virtually all Japanese philosophers at that 
time were members of the Philosophy Society, including Kato Hiroyuki W 
Nishi Arnane Nishimura Shigeki Toyama Shuichi ^ili
IE—, Inoue Tetsujiro Ariga Nagao ffASML Tanahashi Ichiro ffl
g|5, and Miyake Setsurei. According to the prospectus written by Inoue 
Enryo, this group, through a comparative study of Eastern and Western phi­
losophy, looked towards “the incorporation of the merits of both traditions to 
formulate a new philosophy.” Kiyozawa, himself, must have been eager to 
become such a philosopher. Inoue Tetsujiro, the founder of academic philos­
ophy in the Meiji period, thought that “in our country, we have had the tra­
dition of the philosophy of Shinto, Confucianism and Buddhism since ancient 
times” and, therefore, considered Western philosophy as little more than 
“another system of philosophical thought.” Kiyozawa, on the other hand, was 
keenly aware of the logical and academic nature of Western philosophy.
4. Metaphysics in the Meiji Period
Metaphysics (or “Pure Philosophy”) in the Meiji period before Kiyozawa 
held an organic, pantheistic world-view. Inoue Enryo’s “non-dualism of body 
and mind in true suchness (MPnfe'L'OffiEPtM),” Inoue Tetsujiro’s “phenome­
non as real existence (I^>gp^EEfra),” and Miyake Setsurei’s “monism of the 
universe (^PeM—H)” were all examples of such world-views. However, we 
can see little substantial philosophical reflection on their logic when Inoue 
Enryo and Inoue Tetsujiro attempted to unify the binaries of body and mind, 
phenomenon and reality, relative and absolute. This was set forth in their ideas 
of “the reason of dualistic consubstantiation (~te fPW OS)” and “the view of 
complete harmony of all binaries (F4BWSBP),” respectively.
Miyake Setsurei was the first Meiji philosopher to study Hegelian philos­
ophy and its dialectics. His metaphysics owes a great deal to Hegel, yet his 
methodology was not that of dialectics but of analogical inference from the 
known to the unknown, based on an outmoded anthropomorphism. Yet 
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Miyake made the first attempt for a metaphysics using a logical method based 
on “Eastern philosophy,” in that he tried to “correct the problem of losing 
track of priorities and being caught up in wording.” In other words, he real­
ized that a method of metaphysics had to go beyond “rhetoric” and attain 
“logic.”
5. Kiyozawa Manshi as a Philosopher
Kiyozawa’s “philosophy” was not fully formed until after his return to Kyoto 
in 1889, when he gave up an academic career as a philosopher in Tokyo and 
started on his path as a man of the Shinshu Otani denomination. Let us now 
analyze his “philosophy” and clarify its significance. In the Meiji period, prior 
to Nishida Kitaro’s Zen no kenkyii if ©W7? (An Inquiry into the
Good), Kiyozawa was the leading intellectual who “carefully and rationally” 
investigated metaphysics with a strict sense of logic. Kiyozawa’s metaphysics 
was essentially very similar to that of both Inoues and Miyake in the sense 
that it was a philosophy based on an organic understanding of the world. 
However, his critique of Hegelian dialectics and his restructuring of a 
Buddhist dialectics clearly indicate his acute sense of logic and his demand 
for academic rigor in his method. Furthermore, his logic served as a clear basis 
for Nishida Kitaro’s logic of “self-identity of absolute contradictories G6N 
).” Also as a historian of philosophy, Kiyozawa’s Seiyo tet- 
sugakushi kdgi E7T (Lectures on the History of Western
Philosophy) was the first in Japan, preceding Seiyo tetsugakushi SrTff'AT 
(The History of Western Philosophy) by Onishi Hajime and Seiyd tet- 
sugakushiyou iBALiWiT! (A Historical Outline of Western Philosophy) by 
Hatano Seiichi .
Kiyozawa’s metaphysics and philosophy of religion can be understood by 
looking at his Junsei tetsugaku STiMiW (Pure Philosophy), Shiso kaihatsu 
kan (The Developmental Circle of Thought), and Shiikyd tetsug­
aku gaikotsu (Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion). Let us, for
instance, trace his logical elucidation of the idea of “religion.” First of all, 
Junsei tetsugaku “was based upon the theory of German philosopher Rudolf 
Lotze (Metaphysics)” and, just like Lotze, tried to construct a metaphysics in 
the manner of Leibniz. According to Kiyozawa, “pure philosophy” examines 
“varying entities” (things, events, and relationships) and “seeks a universal 
organic connection among all things.” “Pure philosophy,” furthermore, 
“places emphasis on order (logic) as primary and does not emphasize style 
(rhetoric).” In his analysis of “actual existence,” Kiyozawa advocated the the-
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ory of the “oneness of all things (£)” and stressed that “both the ‘one
that includes all things’ and its respective manifestations” are “spiritual enti­
ties Here, his approach was entirely analytical. On the “becom­
ing” of entities, he stated: “Existence is not non-existence and non-existence 
is not existence. No matter how we ponder this, it is impossible for us to con­
sider that both existence and non-existence are included in the same entity. 
However, ‘becoming’ is impossible without the unity of existence and non­
existence. We are then compelled to accept the unity of existence and non­
existence as an inconceivable mystery.” Moreover, referring to the theory of 
the “oneness of all things,” he stated: “It is obvious that if we posit that the 
many and the one are the same, the rule of logic would collapse.” He then 
continued, stating that for now this can be settled by “explaining the ‘one’ in 
terms of the Unlimited (Infinite), and the ‘many’ in terms of the limited 
(finite). The combination of these is called the ‘oneness of all things.’” This 
problem, i.e., how to discover a logic of this “inconceivable” unity of being 
and non-being, the many and the one, became a serious issue, not only for 
Kiyozawa, but also for all Japanese metaphysicians to follow.
6. Seiyo tetsugakushi kogi [Lectures on the History of Western Philosophy]— 
Critique of Hegelian Dialectics I
Kiyozawa’s Seiyo tetsugakushi kogi was the first historical survey of Western 
philosophy in Japan. He covered “From Thales to Spencer” and even pro­
vided criticism on modem philosophers to express his insights. In this piece, 
we can see his implicit “critique” on the dialectic logic of Hegel for the first 
time.
Kiyozawa asked: “Should the first pure being [the Idea] and the syllogism 
[dialectic] be considered as one or two, and if they are two, which comes first? 
Also, when one influences the other, what rules should it follow? If they are 
one, how do the many develop from the one? If we critique [Hegel’s logic] 
in this way, we find there are still some inadequacies.” We must say this is 
acute criticism which revealed Hegel’s surprisingly poor methodological 
awareness, since “if pure being and the syllogism exist side by side, that would 
be relative, and not absolute philosophy.” At the same time, Kiyozawa also 
stated that “what I like about Hegel’s argument” is that he claims “opposites 
are equal” and clarifies that “everything has two aspects: that of being equal 
and that of being different. Seen from one position, all things in the universe, 
being this and that, oppose each other. However, from another viewpoint, they 
are positively related, namely being equal to each other.” Kiyozawa then con- 
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eludes here that “therefore, it is appropriate to say that there have been two 
or more things since the beginning,” and continues “there are more than two 
from the beginning and that is said to be one. One is, from the beginning, not 
one. The many exist as the one and the one exists where the many exist. They 
are neither completely the same nor entirely different (>F—The one as 
many and the many as one, only this is immutable. Call it Nature, it is all of 
nature. Think of it as True Suchness (K®), and it is Tnie Suchness. Call it 
myriad things, and it is myriad things.” In this way, by critically incorporat­
ing Hegelian dialectics, Kiyozawa was building a foundation for new 
Buddhist thought.
7. Shiso kaihatsu kan [The Developmental Circle of Thought]—Philosophy
and Religion
Kiyozawa’s Shiso kaihatsu kan links Hegel’s logical and systematic thought 
with the Lotus Sutra's “ten suchnesses He argues that the progress
of “thought” needs to form a continuously revolving “circle,” always shift­
ing from one category to another. This was a confirmation that the “truthful­
ness” of metaphysics remains within its systematic “consistency.” General 
philosophy does not form such a “circle” because “it cannot be easily 
attained.” “However, one like the Buddha, with his all-seeing wisdom clear­
ly perceives the actual form of all phenomena and can freely explain this truth. 
Hegel, on the other hand, understood that philosophy, in its entirety, consti­
tutes a circle, but in his explanation, as most students of philosophy know, he 
could not avoid confusion and error.” Speaking about the relationship 
between philosophy and religion, Kiyozawa stated that, through philosophy, 
“when one completes the developmental circle of thought, returning to the 
original, fundamental category, where reason is satisfied, one then flips into 
religion.” At this stage of Kiyozawa’s thought, the path is leading from phi­
losophy to religion; and religion is what should be reached at the end of philo­
sophical enterprise.
8. Shukyo tetsugaku gaikotsu—Critique of Hegelian Dialectics II
The results of his intellectual quest are compiled in Shukyo tetsugaku gai­
kotsu. As previously mentioned in the quote from D. T. Suzuki, this book was 
translated by Noguchi Zenshiro UfniiEW and brought to the World’s 
Parliament of Religions at the World Exposition in Chicago in 1893, where 
it received recognition from foreign readers.
The central categories here are “Infinite” and “finite.” While the reason-
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ing mind relates to the “Infinite” through “investigation,” the religious mind 
relates to it in “acceptance.” Kiyozawa insists “when reason and faith are in 
contradiction, we should take the former and throw away the latter.” This was 
his extreme position as a philosopher. Although he created a philosophy of 
religion, he still hadn’t had “the experience” of faith “which accepts the 
Infinite.”
His philosophy of religion can be summarized as follows: the finite (depen­
dent, relative, part, imperfect), and the Infinite (Independent, Absolute, 
Whole, Perfect) are of the same substance (“identity of the two terms” nikd 
dotai ~iHrW). The universe is “an organic constitution, in which innumer­
able finite entities make up one body, the Infinite.” Moreover, Kiyozawa 
stresses “the principle of persistent identity” in the “becoming” of these finite 
entities, which is “an action of the entire universe or of the Infinite itself.” 
Then, he goes on to criticize Hegel’s syllogism [dialectic] of thesis-antithe­
sis-synthesis:
Thesis (A) necessarily and inevitably leads to its antithesis (not-A), 
and the two (A and not-A) again necessarily and inevitably lead to 
synthesis (B). So again, thesis (B) leads to its antithesis (not-B) and 
the two (B and not-B) again lead to the synthesis (C), and so on. 
Here are the two steps or processes: First, (A) leads to (not-A), one 
antecedent leading to a consequent. Second, (A) and (non-A) lead 
to (B), two antecedents leading to a consequent. The second process 
is quite a new view of the law. However, we must ask why, in one 
case, only one antecedent leads to a consequent, while in the other, 
two antecedents lead to a consequent. If a single antecedent could 
lead to a consequent, why not always so? Where is the necessity of 
introducing a new process? However, we can never understand how 
a single antecedent could lead to a consequent.4
According to Kiyozawa, “whenever a thing changes, there must be an out­
standing something, a guest 3? so to speak, to stimulate the master A for the 
meeting Thus, Hegelian dialectics should not be thesis-antithesis-syn­
thesis, but rather Master-Guest-Meeting. This is “the Law of Cause and 
Condition” in Buddhism; Master-Guest-Meeting is the Buddhist dialectics of 
Cause-Condition-Effect.
Why does Hegel’s thought have such a methodological inconsistency? 
According to Kiyozawa, “since Hegel tries to develop a ‘pluraristic relative’ 
4 KMZ, vol. l,pp. 21-22.
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out of a Christian, ‘monistic Absolute,’” he “confuses these two modes as 
though they are governed by the same principle.” However, “there is no 
cause-and-effect relationship between the relative and the Absolute.” 
Kiyozawa continues: “The Infinite, True Suchness, and the finite, myriad 
things, are two aspects of the same entity, neither separate entities nor the suc­
cessive states of the same entity. That the One itself develops into two or the 
Absolute becomes relative, is inconceivable to us.” In this way, Kiyozawa 
rejected the Christian theory of a transcendental God but accepted that of 
immanent pantheism. For Kiyozawa, “the Absolute developing itself to the 
relative” meant that “True Suchness (cause) and Ignorance (condition) give 
birth to myriad things (effect).” Ignorance is “nothing but the incapacity of 
our intelligence, the inconceivability personified.” The development of the 
Infinite spirit in that of the finite should be a finite being turning its ideal or 
boundary from the finite to the Infinite. Kiyozawa’s Buddhism was that of 
“peace of mind, culture of virtue,” that is, self-disciplined Buddhism. 
Moreover, he continuously had to face the alogical paradox of religious expe­
rience—“the relation of the finite many within the Infinite One is truly incon­
ceivable.”5
For Kiyozawa, the choice between the two mysteries—“the Absolute One 
becoming the relative many” (Christianity) and “the finite many within the 
Infinite One” (Buddhism)—was beyond logic or “faith” that transcends logic. 
In order to modernize Buddhism, Kiyozawa chose the latter and tried to sys­
tematize it as a philosopher. As he states “the work of religion begins at the 
point at which philosophy ends,” Kiyozawa first engaged in a “philosophi­
cal” enterprise of “pursuing” the Infinite, after which he devoted himself to 
the “religious” task of “accepting” the Infinite.
Moving from Tokyo to Kyoto, Kiyozawa decisively abandoned “philoso­
phy” and attempted to live “religion.” He put aside worldly benefits and chose 
to seek the path of faith. In such straightforwardness too, Kiyozawa was a 
man of seishin.
9. Obligation to the Religious Order
Why did Kiyozawa decide to return to Kyoto? He mentions his indebtedness 
to the religious order (Higashi Honganji): “I was bom into a secular house­
hold, but by fate, entered the priesthood of Shinshu and received an educa­
tion from the head temple; for this, I feel greatly indebted and am determined 
5 KMZ, vol. l,pp. 21-24.
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to pay back such kindness.” While he demonstrated such a Confucian ethic, 
his decision to go back to Kyoto could have been based on his religious desire 
to experience “the inconceivalibity” of “the finite many within the Infinite 
One,” which could not be theorized, and thus, could not be reached through 
his academic/philosophical enterprise. He tried to approach religion through 
“experiments” to develop “peace of mind, and to foster virtue.” In a letter, 
he writes: “There is nothing in this world as interesting as these experiments.”
In July 1889 at the age of 26, Tokunaga Manshi (whose family name was 
changed to Kiyozawa after 1896) became the principal of Kyoto Public 
Middle School (later to become Kyoto First Middle School), whose manage­
ment was entrusted to Higashi Honganji by the city of Kyoto. In August of 
the same year, he entered Saiho-ji, a large temple in Ohama, (present-day 
Hekinan city, Aichi prefecture), and married Kiyozawa Yasuko. As a princi­
pal with a good salary, he established a residence, grew a mustache, wore a 
frock coat, walked with a cane, and used a rickshaw when going out. It was 
a short, colorful moment in his personal life, and quite a drastic contrast to 
the coming “experiments” of a stoic lifestyle.
In 1891, Kiyozawa completely changed his situation. He shaved off his 
hair, switched from Western-style clothes to priestly vestments, and began to 
walk to work in wooden clogs and a black robe. He stopped smoking and eat­
ing meat, kept away from his wife and children, strictly structured his daily 
life and chanted the Three Pure Land Sutras morning and evening. Ultimately, 
he reached an ascetic lifestyle, cutting out salt and cooked food from his diet, 
eating only buckwheat flour mixed with water at each meal. Such a lifestyle 
indeed reflected his nom de plume at the time, Skeleton. His asceticism seems 
to intensify after his mother’s death in 1892. Through these “experiments,” 
Kiyozawa attempted with his own body to prove what he wrote in his Skeleton 
of a Philosophy of Religion, seeking to realize “the inconceivable” within 
himself. While struggling in these self-power practices, which attempt to 
reach the Infinite from the finite, he did, in fact, find the teaching of the Other 
Power, where the Infinite embraces the finite.
Later, in “Shukyo teki shinnen no hissu joken 
(Requirements for a Religious Conviction),” he wrote: “If you decide to go 
after religious conviction, you must first stop depending on anything except 
religion. Unless you go through the gateway of pessimism once, where you 
leave your house behind, throw away your possessions, and turn away from 
your wife and children, it is difficult to attain true religious conviction."6 
Surely, without “the cultivation of virtue” through self-power practice, one 
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may never gain anjin from the Other Power. Here, Kiyozawa had already 
practiced and experimented with the abstinence promoted in the four Agama 
sutras of Southern Buddhism, which he would later discover.
In the midst of such rigorous practice, working together with Inaba 
Masamaru fOBih, and Sawayanagi Masataro Kiyozawa engaged
himself in lecturing, management, and reform at Kyoto Jinjo Junior High 
School, Otani Middle School, Shinshu University Dormitory, and Okazaki 
Gakkan (an educational institute for the Abbot of Higashi Honganji).
His goal was the independence of Shin Buddhist studies from sectarian pol­
itics, but his reform policy was too radical to be accepted by the head temple. 
Furthermore, in his religious education policy, he established very strict miles 
of conduct in which students had to wear hemp garments and black robes. 
Consequently, he was confronted with a school strike by the junior high dor­
mitory students, finally, in April 1895, as he was pushing his “own-power” 
practice to the limit, his innate frail constitution, exhausted from hard work 
and malnutrition from a strict diet, succumbed to tuberculosis and he was sent 
to a sanatorium in Nishi Tarumi in Kobe, Hyogo prefecture. He said to his 
friends who had recommended a change of air: “Old Tokunaga died here. 
Now I leave this corpse at your disposal.” This marked the beginning of his 
quest for Other Power faith.
10. Awakening
In May 1903, the year before his death, Kiyozawa recollected the process of 
his attainment of faith:
I remember that during my medical retreat in 1895 and 1896, my 
view on life altered completely and I almost changed my feelings 
about self-power, but the ebb and flow of human affairs still kept 
bothering my mind and heart. For example, the administrative 
issues concerning Higashi Honganji in 1896 and 1897 prompted the 
reform movement with the publication of the journal, Kydkai jigen 
TWEWb (Timely Words for the Religious Worldjin 1897 and 1898. 
From the end of 1898 to the beginning of 1899, I read the four 
Agama sutras and, with the discontinuance of the journal, disband­
ed the above-mentioned movement in April of that year. I then had 
the opportunity to rest in my own temple and reflect upon my own
6 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 76.
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thoughts, but was not able to maintain my calm against the troubles 
in human affairs due to the lack of my own spiritual discipline. In 
autumn and winter of 1899,1 came across the writings of Epictetus 
and was deeply impressed. After accepting the invitation to go to 
Tokyo in 1900,1 had more opportunities for spiritual discipline and 
felt like moving forward on that path.
Now the Buddha has given me more difficult tasks and led me fur­
ther on the spiritual path, for which I shall always be grateful.
May 31, 1903.7
From this passage, we can clearly see Kiyozawa’s “awakening (eshin 0 
T')” and “attainment of faith (gyakushin Sfs).” For the external circum­
stances of such awakening, we see the onset of his illness, the failure in the 
religious reform and troubles at home (temple). For its internal circumstances, 
we see his committed contemplation on the Agama sutras, Epictetus and 
Shinran. With these circumstances, Kiyozawa established “Seishin-shugi 
Wi# (Spiritual Activism)” that defined his position on “religion.”
For the first time, on his sickbed in Nishi Tarumi, Kiyozawa began to pay 
close attention to the teachings of Shinran, who had also trodden the long path 
of philosophical inquiry and then come under Honen, who had already real­
ized Other Power faith after traveling along the same spiritual path. Kiyozawa 
did not simply accept Shinran, as presented by Higashi Honganji, but had dis­
covered him on his own. Without relying on existing dogmas, he studied anew 
the Teaching (kyd Practice (gyd ff), Faith (shin ffi) and Realization (sho 
8E) of Shinran’s Kydgyoshinshd SStfffBSE and tried to develop his own phi­
losophy in the Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion that would be more rele­
vant, historically, existentially and experientially. The result was amassed in 
“Zaisho sangeroku (The Record of Repentance in Bed),” which he
had written in Nishi Tarumi. Here, we need to pay special attention to the ele­
ment of Faith, which stresses both the active nature of the Infinite Other Power 
and the passive nature of finite living creatures.
For Kiyozawa, who had experimented with self-power practices, the 
awareness of “being extremely evil, and the worst practicer” as well as the 
“inevitability of karmic retribution” and the subsequent sense of “repentance 
(sange 1#‘IS)” became real for the first time, which was what awoke his faith 
in the Other Power. “Zaisho sangeroku” was Kiyozawa’s self-acquired Shin
7KMZ, vol. 8, pp. 441-2.
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Buddhist studies. Subsequently, how did he view Higashi Honganji with this 
new realization?
11. The Religious Reform Movement
The main concerns of this denomination in the mid-Meiji period were the 
reconstruction of Honganji’s burnt down main hall and a large debt. These 
two important tasks were handled through bank loans and donations from 
branch temples under the rigid administration of Atsumi Kaien who
was put in charge of the head temple’s internal affairs, accounting and doc­
trinal studies in 1889. This naturally furthered the predominance of secular 
power over religious power, the denomination’s degeneration, and the stag­
nation of Shin Buddhist studies. This situation was unbearable for Kiyozawa 
who had set the advancement of these studies as the main goal of the mod­
ernization of Buddhism. When the fundamental educational reform to which 
Kiyozawa and his comrades had devoted themselves was rejected by such 
conservatives as Atsumi in 1895, they were prompted to appeal for the denom­
ination’s general reform. In October 1896, Kiyozawa established the Kyokai 
jigen-sha IWKflStt in Shirakawa Village in the north-east of Kyoto with 
Inoue Hochu Kiyokawa Enjo Tsukimi Kakuryo H&XT
and others, and published seventeen issues of Kyokai jigen from October 1897 
to April 1899, engaging in a spectacular fight with the head temple. These 
four together with Inaba Masamaru and Imagawa Kakushin A7OW, who 
raised money by working as local teachers, founded the so-called “Shirakawa- 
to (Shirakawa Party).” They were also the original drafters of the
impeachment letter to Higashi Honganji in the first issue of Kydkai jigen.
The main purpose of Kiyozawa’s movement was clearly expressed in this 
journal, which discussed the ideas applicable not only to the denomination, 
but also to the general reform of all Buddhist schools in Japan.
Kiyozawa’s ideas were quite radical. The readers may well have felt as 
though they were reading the manifesto of the recent left-wing student move­
ment. In fact, Kiyozawa was facing the same problem, for he was dealing with 
the democratization of Higashi Honganji with emphasis on the liberalization 
of Shin Buddhist studies. Kiyozawa received nationwide support and a 
national reform alliance was also established. The issues he raised did not 
simply concern Atsumi or any other single administration. In fact, it implied 
the overthrow of Honganji’s feudalistic system. If Kiyozawa’s ideal had been 
realized, Higashi Honganji could have done nothing but collapse (although 
Kiyozawa was still blind to the issue of the abbot’s hereditary succession, 
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which made him a typical Meiji person). However, though 20,000 people 
signed the reform petition supporting Kiyozawa, it was still only 2 percent of 
the one million followers belonging to the denomination. Most of the priests 
and followers were not particularly pleased with the reform or were simply 
indifferent. The progress of Kiyozawa’s battle also resembled that of the left­
wing student movement. Although superficially his demands appeared to 
have been accepted, in reality Kiyozawa and his allies were outsmarted by 
the Atsumi administration, as well as the following one headed by Ishikawa 
Shuntai CJUSh*.
Kiyozawa must have known how the situation was at the branch temple 
level, as he, himself, was not welcomed by his parishioners. He looked 
unkempt, had lung disease, rejected the ideas of hell and the Pure Land, and 
only discussed complex issues. He was often not allowed to perform services 
and was about to be banished from his own temple. Once, he gave a talk at 
the Hb-on-ko service with his spittoon. Reportedly, when the service
began, the hall was overflowing with people, but by the afternoon, only a few 
still remained. What sort of reform could he possibly cany out in such a des­
perate condition? He fought a hopeless battle from the start, and the issues he 
struggled with are still unresolved today.
In the end, the six reformers were excommunicated and the movement 
ended in failure. Kiyozawa had no choice but to admit that he had underesti­
mated the difficulty of reforming Higashi Honganji with 7,000 branch tem­
ples and “now will abandon the reform movement entirely and devote myself 
to gaining religious conviction.” Through this movement, Kiyozawa recog­
nized that, before the reform of the structure and system, the spiritual growth 
of each priest and follower need to come first. Hence he decided to advance 
the Seishin-shugi Movement as a teacher.
12. The Yow Agamas and Epictetus
According to his “Bybsho zassi ThAW* (Journal from the Sickbed),” 
Kiyozawa had started reading the four Agamas on New Year’s Day in 1899 
and finished them by February 15th. He was the first Meiji scholar to appre­
ciate the Agamas, which had formerly been neglected as being Theravada 
scriptures. With the spirit of a Buddhist practitioner, he was trying to discover 
the everyday practice of Sakyamuni from these ancient texts.
After being pardoned by Higashi Honganji in April 1899, Kiyozawa first 
returned to Saiho-ji from Kyoto with his family. Then moved to Tokyo in 
September to become the President of Shinshu University A A AY, which had
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just been moved there. While staying at his friend Sawayanagi Masataro’s 
residence, he came across and read The Discourses of Epictetus, which he 
called “the best bookin the West.” Why did this Stoic philosopher from Rome 
impress Kiyozawa so much? In Rdsenki fiJJOE (December Fan), Kiyozawa 
divided Epictetus’ lessons into ten items. Among these, the first and the most 
important one was to distinguish between the voluntary and involuntary 
'EM® and to dwell in anjin, which does not pursue involuntariness. Kiyozawa 
states:
There exist voluntary and involuntary things. The voluntary things 
are opinions, actions, and likes/dislikes; the involuntary things are 
physical bodies, properties, honors and status. The former belong 
to one’s own doing while the latter do not. In dealing with volun­
tary things, one is free, unlimited and not interfered with. With 
respect to involuntary things, one is feeble, enslaved and in the palm 
of another’s hand. When perceiving this distinction incorrectly, one 
encounters interference, lapses into sorrow, cries out, and comes to 
curse and slander gods and people. Those who correctly recognize 
what ‘voluntary’ is experience no oppression, encounter no inter­
ference, slander no one, do not curse heaven, hurt no one, are hurt 
by no one, nor have any enemies in the world.8
What Kiyozawa wanted to stress was to “accept what’s given by Heaven and 
to do one’s best.”
13. Kbkbdb
In his administration at Shinshu University, Kiyozawa aimed at educating stu­
dents as Buddhists. His policy was, however, compromised by the secular 
demands of the students, who wanted the school to be accredited by the 
Ministry of Education in order for them to obtain teaching cetificates. In 
October 1903, Kiyozawa submitted his resignation. Though he was not suc­
cessful as a reformer, those three years in Tokyo were his most productive as 
a religious person, for Kiyozawa’s Seishin-shugi was consummated and his 
related movement expanded.
Pupils such as Akegarasu Haya Sasaki Gessho AW/KfJFL Tada
Kanae and Tokiwa Daijo MlKA® had gathered around Kiyozawa in
Tokyo in September 1901, marking the beginning of Kbkbdb “Koko”
8 KMZ, vol. 8, p. 356.
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implies “one’s direct experience of a thing itself” and the state of being ful­
filled, while fully relying on the Absolute Infinite. This gathering moved from 
Hongo to Sugamo and continued even after Kiyozawa’s death until 1919. The 
journal, Seishinkai (Spiritual World), also continued to be published,
and in addition to the above-mentioned four, other bright minds contributed 
to modem Pure Land Buddhism. Those who joined the group were: Kusunoki 
Ryuzo Kondo Jungo Ando Shuichi Soga Ryojin W
Kaneko Daiei AAA'A; Akanuma Chizen and Yamabe
Shugaku l [Ji/Ji’Y'Y’. This free and egalitarian society, resembling “the original 
sangha," was opened to anyone who was interested in Buddhism.
In those days, what Kiyozawa loved to read most was the Tannishd (SfcH 
fi>), which was written by Yuien eftH twenty or thirty years after Shinran’s 
death. Although Rennyo UM the 8th Abbot of Honganji, first acknowledged 
its importance, he later stipulated that it should not be circulated indiscrimi­
nately, due to its possible dangers for the denomination. It was Kiyozawa 
Manshi, along with Nanjo Bun’yu and Chikazumi Jokan
who reintroduced it as the most important text for Pure Land Buddhism in the 
Meiji period. Although Kiyozawa had already read the Tannishd when he was 
a student, it did not become part of his own experience until years later, when 
he admitted that “my ‘Three Great Sutras’ are the Tannishd, Agamas and The 
Discourses of Epictetus" and his three great people were Shinran, Sakyamu- 
ni and Socrates. Nishimura Kengyo one of the editors of Kiyozawa
Manshi Zenshu observes that:
What Kiyozawa learned from reading the Agamas was “Sakyamu- 
ni’s spirit of renunciation” and from Epictetus was the “awareness 
of one’s limited self.” If we are to say that Kiyozawa understood 
the Nembutsu of the Tannishd through the Agamas and The 
Discourses of Epictetus, it means that he saw renunciation in “namu 
and our limited self in “amidabutsu One leaves
one’s family and the world in a single-minded entrusting of namu, 
and at that same moment, both the family and the world reemerge 
as the merit-giving activity of Amida Buddha. This conversion is 
Seishin-shugi, and hence its true meaning is none other than 
Nembutsu-shugi (Nembutsu-ism).9
According to Kiyozawa, the Agamas and The Discourses of Epictetus had 
9 KMZ (Hozokan edition), vol. 8, p. 620.
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to be read first, and then the anjin of the Tannishd could be experienced, and 
consequently, the Agamas and The Discourses of Epictetus could also be 
embraced in the world of the Tannishd. If this world existed first, the Agamas 
and The Discourses of Epictetus would be outside of it, and hence the anjin 
of the Tannishd would not be experienced.
For Kiyozawa, the path from philosophy to religion, as well as that from 
thought to experience, was the same as the one from the Skeleton of a Phi­
losophy of Religion to “Zaisho sangeroku,” and further still, to Seishin-shugi, 
which was the shift from “choosing reason over faith when these two con­
tradict” as found in the Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion to “abandoning 
reason and choosing faith.” Kiyozawa’s “Three Great Sutras” were indeed 
significant in such a conversion.
14. Seishin-shugi
The '''seishin'" that Kiyozawa ultimately reached was the religious attitude 
“that accepts the Infinite,” and such Seishin-shugi was “religious conviction.”
Kiyozawa produced three works entitled “Seishin-shugi.” The first one 
was an article (no. 1) and the other two were lectures (no. 2 & no. 3). They 
were all rough drafts, but surely present Seishin-shugi from the standpoint of 
the Agama sutras, The Discourses of Epictetus, and the Tannishd. The first 
emphasizes “the establishment of self;” the second, “subjectivism;” and the 
third, “faith in Other Power.” If I were to put its essence into just a few words, 
I should quote Kiyozawa, himself, “the way Seishin sits,” i.e., to maintain 
anjin, is what religion is all about.
The fact that Seishin-shugi is “religious conviction,” means that it is not 
concerned with “academic theories,” i.e., “scientific and philosophical stud­
ies,” and is distinguished from “common morality.” Namely, “religion pro­
vides a different world besides that of social benefits and ethical behavior.” 
Such clear duality existed in Kiyozawa’s mind.
It also means that Seishin-shugi needs to include having an unshakable stoic 
mind that does not waver at anything. Kiyozawa stated: “We simply are to 
depend on the Absolute Infinity. The matter of life and death is not worth wor­
rying about, let alone the following matters: excommunication is acceptable, 
imprisonment bearable, and slander, exclusion and all kinds of insults are not 
minded at all. Rather, we shall entirely enjoy what is given by the Absolute 
Infinity.”10 What is required here is the opportunity for “spiritual discipline,” 
as we see in Kiyozawa’s recollection of his “attainment of faith,” [II, 10] 
10 KMZ, vol. 6, p. 110.
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which has to be “something to be resolved through actual experiment.”
The essence of the “conviction” of Seishin-shugi is “banbutsu ittai.” 
Kiyozawa states: “Since Seishin-shugi focuses on actions, there is no partic­
ular need for academic theory. In order to promote actions, however, it speaks 
of a single ideal. Such an ideal may be called the idea of banbutsu ittai or the 
principle of banbutsu dotai (single-body-of-all),”11 which is not
11 KMZ, vol. 6,p. 298.
12 Ibid., p. 73.
however a philosophical theory or principle, but rather, “in Seishin-shugi, we 
can reach the perspective of banbutsu ittai by “the way Seishin sits.” In the 
Shukyd tetsugaku gaikotsu, the banbutsu ittai theory is seen as a “logical mys­
tery,” but is now recognized as “conviction” in a subjective “action.” 
Kiyozawa went beyond the Kantian philosophy of dualism in theory and prac­
tice with his “Faith in Other Power.”
What needs to be emphasized here is that “with much introspection and 
reflection on one’s standpoint, the first thing we detect is our ignorance and 
inability and the fact that we are mediocre people who commit evil and 
are bom and die.” To obtain anjin means to “totally depend on the Great 
Compassion (daihi A?T) of the Infinite Other Power.” There is banbutsu ittai, 
but the duality of the finite and the Infinite still remains—this mystery is the 
Great Compassion of the Infinite. At this important juncture, we find repen­
tance and faith. “Seishin-shugi,” according to Kiyozawa, “is none other than 
pragmatism, which develops at the place where the relative enters into the 
Absolute and the finite meets the Infinite.” “At such a place,” however, “we 
speak of the Absolute outside of the relative and the Infinite outside of the 
finite and above all, what we call satisfaction in our hearts is given by the 
Absolute Infinity.”12 Using Hegelian terminology, Kiyozawa called the ini­
tiator of this Great Compassion “the Absolute Infinite” in “Seishin-shugi, no. 
1 (January 1901).” In nos. 2 and 3 (July 1901 and June 1902) he called it 
“tenchi banbutsu or banbutsu ittai (all-things-in-the-universe)” and “Other 
Power” or “Tathagata” respectively. In his last piece of writing right before 
his death, entitled “Waga shinnen (My Faith),” he mostly called it
“Tathagata.” As Soga Ryojin suggests, this shifting of the terms may be 
understood as the deepening of Kiyozawa’s “faith.” This Tathagata was “the 
Tathagata for oneself” and “Tathagata for one’s convictions.” In Kiyozawa’s 
own words, it was “the Tathagata that I cannot help but trust.”
His “faith” was built on the logic of duality; his notion of “seishin” was
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mediated by Western philosophy, but never equated with either “the objec­
tive Spirit” or “the Absolute Spirit” of the Hegelian kind—it was “subjective 
Spirit” through and through. Nishitani Keiji A A® A called it the “humanis­
tic Spirit.”13 It was “seishin” of a “religious human being.” While Kiyozawa 
spoke of Seishin-shugi, he never said that the Tathagata was Seishin, and pre­
cisely because of this duality that “Tathagata” [is not Seishin but] exists in 
Seishin, his Other Power faith can be, as dictated by “Tathagata,” the driving 
force in social critique and structural reform. Yoshida Kyuichi (to
13 Nishitani 1990.
whom this paper is greatly indebted), who has written the only detailed biog­
raphy of Kiyozawa to date, calls our attention to the article, “Seishin shugi 
undo no genkai (The Limits of the Seishin-shugi
Movement),” and comments that “Kiyozawa’s spiritual awakening was at 
odds with the ordinary mass of people, whose wishes were not necessarily 
part of his faith.” The task of bridging this gap, however, should belong to 
the Pure Land followers in today’s modernized society rather than to 
Kiyozawa.
The last line of his diary reads: “Be a slave to the Tathagata and not to any 
other.”
15. Death
On November 5th, 1903, Kiyozawa made a prediction to one of his students, 
Chikazumi Jokan, as follows: “Everything has collapsed this year—the 
school, my wife and children, and now I will collapse.” After returning to 
Saiho-ji, and while coughing up blood, Kiyozawa finished writing 
“Shukyoteki dotoku (zokutai) to futsu dotoku to no kosho
(Negotiating Religious Morality and Ordinary Morality),” 
and “Waga shinnen.” The latter was his final written piece completed a week 
before his death. After coughing up a large amount of blood on the 3rd and 
4th of June, another student, Harako Hironobu IMYlSfi, asked him: “Teacher, 
you won’t make it this time. Do you have anything you want to say?” “There 
is nothing to say,” Kiyozawa replied, and at 1:00 a.m. on the 6th, “finally took 
his last breath while smiling wryly.” His last nom de plume was “Himpii S 
® (Shore Breeze).” He wrote to Akegarasu Haya in Tokyo on June 1st as fol­
lows: “The nom de plume, Himpu, is my recent acquisition and came from 
the idea that Ohama is a windy place, which now seems so appropriate for a 
half-dead ghost like myself. I also find it amusing that this name has synthe-
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sized all of my previous nom de plumes, namely Kenpd (while residing 
in Nagoya), Gaikotsu (in Kyoto), Sekisui Czk (in Maiko ^±), and Rosen fli 
B (in Tokyo). With my new name, I will vanish into thin air.” This was the 
first and last humorous comment from Kiyozawa.
III. Suzuki Daisetz—Man of Reisei
1. Nom de plume, “Daisetz”
It is easy to understand how Kiyozawa Manshi changed his nom de plume 
from Kenpd, Gaikotsu, Sekisui, Rosen and eventually to Himpii, in order to 
express different periods of his state of mind or how he defined himself. 
However, when it comes to the “Daisetz ±}®” of Suzuki Teitaro
“the Buddhist scholar who dominated an entire intellectual period” and rep­
resented modem Zen, people may feel lost as to how to make sense of his 
state of mind or self-definition. “Daisetz” is said to come from a passage in 
the Hekiganroku “Great skillfulness (daigyd ±15) is similar to unskill­
fulness (setsu J®),” a name which Suzuki kept for his entire life. This passage 
is quite different from “the wisest resembles the unwise,” which means to 
define and evaluate others. First, it has to be an expression of self-confidence 
when one evaluates oneself as “the most skillful.” At the same time, it also 
has to be an expression of frustration when one sees oneself as “the unskill­
ful.” What of this frustration? Suzuki, who had had his kensho experience at 
the age of 25 while practicing zazen at Engaku-ji in Kamakura, becom­
ing “the most skillful,” must have experienced the frustration of being 
“unskillful” while trying to describe his kensho—the realization of the “true 
nature” of human existence—in “language.” It was the frustration of a per­
son who had decided to devote his lifetime to trying to explain, through rel­
ative language, “special transmission outside the scriptures (kyoge betsuden 
®OJ6s),” “not relying on words and letters (furyu monji “direct­
ly pointing to a person’s mind (jikishi ninshin ififeAT'),” and “attaining 
Buddhahood by perceiving one’s nature (kensho jobutsu all of
which belong to the absolute world beyond “words.” The life of Suzuki was 
that of a tireless writer who had tried to make Zen and Buddhist thought under­
standable to modem readers.
2. Suzuki Daisetz, the Writer
However, no one dares call Suzuki, the world-renowned torch-bearer of Zen, 
“unskillful.” All the credit for introducing Zen abroad and creating today’s 
Zen popularity in the West—be it substantial or not—goes to Suzuki alone.
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The enjoyable nature and skillfulness of his writings in Japanese are obvious 
just by reading Nihonteki reisei H ATIlSBft (Japanese Spirituality) published 
in 1944. Many of his English works have also been praised, for instance by 
Masutani Fumio describing them as, “with invigorating tension and
refreshing feeling.”
One day, Suzuki supposedly told Masutani the following:
Awakening of Faith tfe by Memyo SRl (Asvaghosa), there is 
a story about taking out a wedge by another wedge. By driving a 
wedge, you formed a crack, but that wedge is in, right? When you 
want to take out that wedge, you need to drive in another, then 
another and again another one. In this way, wedges are needed 
infinitely. Language is replaced by language. That is the human lim­
itation, always using and destroying language repeatedly. In rigor­
ous Zen practice, you just thunder out or say something 
incomprehensible. That is where one must reach at the very end.
Can we now understand Suzuki’s frustration? His nom de plume, 
“Daisetz,” must have been the expression of such frustration. Although we 
should not be caught up too much in the matter of nom de plumes, I still find 
it significant that he chose “great unskillfulness” rather than “great fool,” 
“great fake” or “great evil.” Kiyozawa’s Buddhism sought either truth or fal­
sity, as well as good or evil, while Suzuki’s, on the other hand, seems to rep­
resent a religiousness that valued skillfulness and aesthetic values. How 
skillfully can one express the state of Zen, which is grasped by aesthetic intu­
ition, beyond language?
3. The Magnitude of Daisetz
As mentioned earlier, for myself, Suzuki is like a distant relative of promi­
nent standing. His work includes more than eighty books in Japanese and 
close to thirty volumes in English, several of which have also been translat­
ed into German and French. He played a magnificent role as an illuminator 
of Buddhist thought, especially Zen, inside and outside Japan. His role, in 
fact, was not limited to just being that, but also an elucidator and excavator 
of Buddhism itself. His most popular masterpiece may be Zen Buddhism and 
its Influence on Japanese Culture published in 1938. Also significant are his 
studies of the Lahkdvatara Sutra and the Gandavyiiha Sutra in Indian Bud­
dhism, the history of Chinese Buddhism (especially Bodhidharma mW), and 
the history of Japanese Buddhism (especially Zen and Pure Land Buddhist
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thought), with which Suzuki brought modem intellectuals close to their under­
standing. Especially, in the area of Zen, he unearthed “Unborn Zen (fushd- 
zen of the Zen monk Bankei who had been completely buried
in the history of Japanese Zen Buddhism. Along with those of Dogen IMtE, 
Hakuin SB, Suzuki counted Bankei’s Zen as one of three types of Zen 
thought in Japan. At the same time, Suzuki also studied Pure Land doctrine, 
unraveling the ultimate form of popular Japanese religious experience for 
modem intellectuals and stunning them with a series of provocative studies 
on the “myokdnin.” These two specific accomplishments are most remark­
able for the history of Japanese ideas. Furthermore, in Mushin to iukoto feb 
iVU’t (On ‘No-mind’) published in 1940 and Jodo-kei shisd-ron
(Studies in Pure Land Thought), published in 1942, Suzuki clarified 
the ultimate common ground between Zen and Pure Land Buddhist thought 
and advanced what he would later call the concept of “Japanese Spirituality.” 
That concept, from this editor’s standpoint, is Suzuki’s greatest achievement 
and that is why we have included Nihonteki reisei as his representative work 
in this volume [of Nihon no meicho].
The breadth of Suzuki as a man, however, seems to have derived not from 
such external accomplishments but rather from the depth of his own “real­
ization.” Although it sounds very strange to say that breadth comes from 
depth, it seems appropriate for Suzuki. Furuta Shokin one of his stu­
dents, states that what is most remarkable about Suzuki was “the depth of his 
Zen experience.”14 While Kiyozawa went through changes and developments 
in his ideas during his short life of forty-one years, Suzuki underwent none 
in his fundamental thinking during his long life of ninety-six years. Moreover, 
the latter’s monistic view of Nihonteki reisei seems to overwhelm Kiyozawa’s 
dualistic Seishin-shugi at times.
4. Nihonteki reisei
The Zen experience that Suzuki had maintained since his earlier age was ulti­
mately termed “Nihonteki reisei.” Its origin, history and details were sys­
tematically articulated in his essay Nihonteki reisei. In the introduction to its 
new postwar edition published in 1948, he commented that he “had well 
before established the opinion” that there was such a thing [as Nihonteki rei­
sei]. During World War II, Suzuki strongly felt that nationalism, totalitarian­
ism and State Shinto were not “what our country should stand on in the future” 
14 Furuta 1961.
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and decided to dig further into the inner life of the Japanese “to unearth what 
was buried until now.” According to him “Nihonteki reiser was supposed­
ly a universal reality in its origin, but it had surfaced through consciousness 
“in its purest form” in the Pure Land and Zen Buddhism of the Kamakura 
period. “The Pure Land experience is manifested on the affective or emo­
tional side of Japanese spirituality, while its intellectual part appears in the 
transformation into Zen of Japanese life.”
The Pure Land Buddhist myokonin “Saichi always employed Ncimu 
Amidabutsu with absolute independence” and this “is his Person and one per­
son ‘for the sake of this one individual person, Shinran;’ at the same time, he 
is also Rinzai Zen’s true man of no title *li©MA and ‘the only one in all the 
universe.’” While reisei means religious (Buddhist) consciousness, Suzuki 
stressed its specific characteristics such as earthwardness, non-literality, 
straightforwardness, concrete truthfulness and immediate life facticity. 
Especially important was its two-in-oneness where, according to Mutai 
Risaku “the Mother of Life, Great Compassion’s embrace, burning
desire, and the certainty of hell all exist together.” According to Suzuki, “the 
logic of the Earth,” where such Nihonteki reisei manifests itself, is the same 
as “the logic of the non-duality in the wisdom” in Zen and “the faith of the 
Earth” becomes the Namu Amidabutsu of the Shin Buddhist denomination. 
Whether or not “the logic of the Earth” and “the faith of the Earth” are the 
same, still remains an important question for Japanese religion, but Suzuki 
was certainly the great pioneer, who tried to ultimately unify various types of 
Japanese religious experience and overcome “sectarianism” within the his­
tory of Japanese Buddhism. Suzuki was such a “man of Spirituality.”
5. Reisei and Seishin
Suzuki distinguishes his idea of “reisei” from that of “seishin” which can be 
considered a Western concept. “Seishin always contains dualism within 
itself,” but reisei “sees that the two are, after all, not two but one and the one 
is, as it is, two.” It is said that “spirituality is the operation latent in the depths 
of seishim, when it awakens, the duality within seishin dissolves. It can sense, 
think, will and act in this true form.” Kiyozawa’s dualistic seishin seems to 
be encompassed by Suzuki’s monistic reisei.
As articulated by Suzuki in Nihonteki reisei, “the heart of Pure Land 
thought lies in the Nembutsu JadA and not in attaining birth in the Pure Land.” 
“I am rather inclined to think of djo as a kind of symbol... What is impor­
tant is Nembutsu itself; single-minded Nembutsu alone is important. 
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Tentatively, we think that djo lies beyond the denial of the present world, but 
in Namu Amidabutsu, ojo and the denial are really unified.” If it were other­
wise, it would not be true that “the relation between this world and the Pure 
Land is mutually reflective, mirror-imaged, continuous of discontinuity, and 
thus “ocho IM® (side-wise leap).”15 However, in this Pure Land logic of 
sokuhi presented by Suzuki, does the Pure Land really exist or not? If it does, 
its reality will not be monistic. In Kiyozawa’s Pure Land Buddhism, “we 
believe in Shinto and Buddhist deities not because these exist, but rather, that 
they exist for us. Moreover, we believe in hell and the Pure Land not because 
hell and the Pure Land exist. When we believe in them, both exist for us” 
(“religion is subjective reality”). Thus, “there is no point in arguing whether 
hell and the Pure Land exist or the spirit perishes or not.” Furthermore, for 
Kiyozawa, we see an intellectual restraint making him say that “if religion is 
subjective reality, it is not fair to ask whether the facts of religion and faith 
are objectively accurate or not.” Such restraint represents what Kiyozawa 
meant by seishin. For Suzuki’s reisei, does the Pure Land exist? When he 
states shaba (this suffering world) is the Pure Land (shaba soku jodo 
?£±), what kind of logic is he implying? Will “the logic of the Earth” and 
“the faith of the Earth” necessarily be one or not? Which path shall we take— 
choosing “the logic of the Earth” through constructing the logic of Nihonteki 
reisei like Suzuki (i.e., drawing Pure Land Buddhism toward Zen and unify­
ing them) or choosing “the faith of the Earth,” by giving up the logic and 
depending on the “mystery” like Kiyozawa? As long as religion is based on 
the absolute reality of each individual, the choice must be up to one’s reli­
gious experience. In any case, it seems that we are witnessing two types of 
modem Japanese Buddhism in Kiyozawa’s “seishin'’'' and Suzuki’s “reisei.”
IV. Remaining Issues
1. Kiyozawa, Suzuki and Nishida Kitaro
Although we have been looking at Kiyozawa Manshi and Suzuki Daisetz as 
representatives of modern Japanese Buddhist thinkers, it is generally accept­
ed that Nishida Kitaro was the first person in modem Japan to formulate a 
“philosophy” based on the Buddhist world-view. It is often said that if Japan 
were to export an original philosophy overseas, it would be called “Nishida 
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Nishitani Keiji, Nishida’s student, was the first to pay attention to 
Kiyozawa’s influence on Nishida’s thought. When Nishitani was about to 
teach at Otani University, Nishida reminded him that it was the university 
where Kiyozawa had once taught. In Nishida’s diary, there are four references 
to Kiyozawa. On January 14, 1903, it says “I read and was impressed by 
Kiyozawa’s piece in Seishinkai.” On July 17, 1904, immediately after 
Kiyozawa’s death, it reads, “I visited Inabaat Jokb-in around 6:00 p.m. 
and talked about Kiyozawa.” On May 9, 1906, it states, “I read Kiyozawa’s 
Shinkd zadan (Talk about Faith),” and finally on August 3, 1908, it
reads, “I wrote an article called ‘Chi to ai ® (Knowledge and Love)’ for 
Seishinkai.” Could it be Kiyozawa’s “Meimonsha no an’i 
(Consolation of the Lost and Agonized)” or “Hotoke niyoru yuki 
M (Encouraged by the Buddha)” that Nishida read in Seishinkai in 1903? 
After Kiyozawa’s death, Nishida visited Kokodo in Tokyo, where he used to 
attend the reading group of Kiyozawa’s last written piece, “Waga shinnen,” 
while teaching at the Fourth Imperial School. His article, “Chi to ai” men­
tioned in his diary entry from 1908, became the last chapter of Zen no kenkyit. 
There we read, “Although science and morality receive the Light of this Other 
Power of each individual phenomenon, religion directly touches the Absolute, 
the Infinite Buddha on the whole universe. And knowing this Absolute, 
Infinite Buddha or God becomes possible by merely loving it.” As Shiba 
Rydtaro pointed out, the close resemblance to Kiyozawa’s writing, not only 
in terms of content but also in expression, is noticeable in this sentence.
When regarding Kiyozawa as a philosopher, what are the similarities and 
differences between Kiyozawa’s and Nishida’s metaphysics? Earlier I men­
tioned that Kiyozawa’s Buddhist reconstruction through Hegelian dialectics 
had served as a bridge for Nishida’s “self-identity of absolute contradicto­
ries,” which was the basis for “the logic of place” and “the dialectic of noth­
ingness,” as both philosophers formulated their metaphysics (philosophy of 
religion) through the critical adoption of such dialectics. Concerning Hegel’s 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis, Kiyozawa commented as follows: “Between 
thesis and antithesis, there must a bridge which connects both sides. Without 
both the opposite and common features, there won’t be any philosophy nor 
any change in things. When we seek the development in philosophy or change 
in things, the common element, standing between thesis and antithesis, 
becomes most important.” Here, Kiyozawa was suggesting that the antithe­
sis is not “contradiction” of the thesis, but its “opposite” and, as Hegel, him­
self, stated, its “limited negation,” thus stressing that these must be
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“self-limitation” of “the Universal” as Nishida later articulated. Therefore, 
ultimately, while Kiyozawa’s dialectic of Master, Guest and Meeting tries to 
remain as the Universal at the bottom of the “opposite,” Nishida’s “dialectic 
of absolute nothingness” sought the Universal at the bottom of the “contra­
diction.” Here, their difference may be understood as that between Pure Land 
Buddhism and Zen. Ironically, by regarding “being” as the basis of both, the 
dualism of this world and the other stands, and denying it with “nothing,” 
monism prevails. After all, however, the religious logic is still paradoxical.
Suzuki’s influence on Nishida, his best lifetime friend, was undeniable. We 
can even reconsider whether the latter’s idea of the “self-identity of absolute 
contradictories” was his own or a collaboration between both of them. Suzuki 
claimed that the logic of the illiterate myokonins’ faith was none other than 
“the self-identity of absolute contradictories” and playfully teased Nishida 
by saying that “a common, old woman can readily speak of what a philoso­
pher has obtained after a lifetime of extracting all his ideas.”16 In his final 
years, he frequently quoted Suzuki and even appeared to have Suzuki as the 
basis of his arguments. The fundamental experience embedded in their think­
ing was the same; “the dialectic of nothingness” is no different from “the 
logic of sokuhi." If we regard Nishida as a philosopher and Suzuki as a reli­
gious person, the former’s life’s work was to “philosophically” articulate the 
same milieu that Suzuki described “rhetorically.” Ueyama Shunpei ±di Wd2, 
the editor of Nishida Kita.ro in Nihon no meicho, made the final evaluation of 
his philosophy as follows: “The originality of Nishida’s thought lies at the 
level of germination and not that of the finished product; it merely opened the 
door for a new type of philosophy.” Similarly, we should also say that 
Suzuki’s work merely opened the door for a new type of religion, and the 
issues raised for the former should also be raised for the latter as well.
2. Some Issues for Modem Japanese Buddhism
Japanese Buddhism in the past 100 years since the Meiji period has made var­
ious efforts in so-called modernization through philological studies and mod­
em translations of the Buddhist scriptures, theorization and systematization 
of its thought, the reform of religious organizations, and confrontation with 
modem ideas. In this “Introduction,” we have neglected to place Kiyozawa 
and Suzuki in such a historical context within modem Japanese Buddhism. 
For example, Kiyozawa’s Seishin-shugi Movement should be contrasted with
16 Suzuki 1976.
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the New Buddhist Movement of Sakaino Koyd the No-self Love
Movement of Ito Shoshin ITKsiEflJ, Kyudo Gakusha of Chikazumi
Jokan Itto-en —fTKI ofNishidaTenko andtheNichirenism
ofTakayama Chogyu aiLlEJ W As Kiyozawa, himself, mentioned in 
his article, “Bukkyo no koki (The Rise of Buddhism),” that there
were three periods even within the Buddhist history of the Meiji period. The 
first was when Buddhists became just like secular people (haibutsu kishaku 
ffEASIL, in the first decade of that period), the second was when, over­
whelmed by Christian advancement, Buddhism resisted it with science and 
philosophy (i.e., the second decade, when Inoue Enryo and others took ini­
tiatives), and the last period was when the Original Vow of Faith was real­
ized (the third decade of Meiji and afterwards). If we were to analyze the 
historical background of Kiyozawa’s Seishin-shugi Movement or why “ian- 
jin (heretics)” like Kiyozawa, Ito and Chikazumi emerged from
Higashi Honganji rather than Nishi Honganji, we should have returned to “the 
heretical incident” of the so-called Sango wakuran in the Edo peri­
od. Furthermore, we should have continued to trace from the Seishin-shugi 
Movement after Kiyozawa’s death to the troubles in the Otani denomination 
today. For Suzuki’s place in the history of Buddhism, we could have also dis­
cussed what Furuta Shokin meant by “[Suzuki as] a back road walker.” While 
my lack of ability and preparation could certainly be blamed for all these 
shortcomings, it is also true that I am most interested in the thoughts of 
Kiyozawa and Suzuki.
Now, while realizing that these two are unsurpassable, I wish to present 
them with questions concerning today’s Buddhism, namely, the problem of 
Buddhism and the state. In its teachings, the state has originally been part of 
the “human” and not of “nature.” Primitive Buddhism held the “theory of 
state contract” and often regarded the king and thief in the same light, telling 
people to stay away from both.17 For Indian Buddhists, Buddhism meant “to 
construct an ideal society (sangha) with its own spiritual connections, sepa­
rating itself from the sovereignty of kings.” However, for most Japanese 
Buddhists who had already accepted Buddhism as a state religion in the Nara 
period, they rejected such an idea as “Theravadin.” They conceived of the 
realization of the Buddhist ideal with state power as “Mahayanist” in nature 
and supported its scriptures, which advocated such a view. However, the lead­
ers of new Buddhism in the Kamakura period, such as Honen, Dogen and 
17 Nakamura 1989.
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Shinran, did not positively uphold the view that affirms the state. Rather, their 
Buddhism criticized or denied the state itself (Nichiren’s nationalistic 
Buddhism was their shadow image).
We can detect that both Kiyozawa and Suzuki saw that Buddhism should 
not depend on state power. If that’s the case though, be it dualism or monism, 
shouldn’t their philosophies have clearly included ways to criticize the state 
and challenge the status quo? I believe that it would be a difficult though pos­
sible “philosophical” endeavor, but with this, we can say that Buddhism stood 
at a new “starting line” in Kiyozawa and Suzuki.
(Translated by Murakami Tatsuo)
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